Defeat of the Red Army Essay Example for Free

Defeat of the Red Army Essay By looking at what the areas where the Soviets failed during their in Afghanistan, we can further develop our counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine and shape our forces. Mujahideen Defeats of the Red Army An important and remarkable event in history was the Soviet-Afghan War. The Afghans, like their ancestors, battled a hostile, invading force that wanted to dominate their homeland. â€Å"For the first time, Afghanistan would become the center of a modern pan-Arab Jihad (Holy War)† (Hill, 2008). The Afghans were fighting a war of attrition just as their ancestors did during the Anglo-Afghan Wars. The Afghans would find themselves using modern weapons that had the potential of causing a high number casualties and emigration of greater proportions. The difference between the Afghans in the Soviet-Afghan War and the Afghans who fought in the Anglo-Afghan war would be the help and support from outside superpowers. By the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviet Union was at the point of falling; the Afghans and those who were assisting them were looking at a victory. How could such a powerful country like the Soviet Union be defeated by the Afghans? The Soviet Union lost the Soviet-Afghan War as a result of mistakes and failures that they made. The Soviets failure to seal the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, failure to stand up and effective Afghan Army and failure to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people contributed to the defeat of the Red Army. Failure to Disrupt Supply Lines During the initial five years of occupation, the Soviets never mounted a sustained effort to cut off the Mujahideen supply lines that ran from Pakistan’s tribal areas, across the Hindu Kush Mountains, and into Afghanistan (Roy, 1991). Instead, the focus of the Soviets from 1980 to 1982 was to conduct large-scale armored operations in locations that were considered hotbeds of rebel activity. After 1982, the Soviets used aerial assaults to assist in their combat operations to eliminate the support base of the Mujahideen. It was not until 1985 that the Red Army starting making an effort to disrupt the Mujahideen supply lines. The Red Army began using Spetsnaz units, which were the Red army Special Forces units, behind Mujahideen frontlines, to organized surprise attacks against the rebel supply caravans. Once the Spetsnaz had the location of the Mujahideen, they would load into Mi-24 helicopter gunships, sneak behind the Mujahideen positions, and launch attacks. The effectiveness of the raids the Spetsnaz used became apparent in 1986 where there was a decrease in the number of Mujahideen attacks against the Soviets. The attacks against the Soviets decreased because the Mujahideen was not able to get men and equipment that they needed to mount an effective guerrilla campaign. The Soviets leadership was aware of the amount of men and a large amount of equipment that the Mujahideen was moving from Pakistan across into Afghanistan on regular bases, so it’s interesting why they did not make an effort earlier in the war to disrupt the supply lines. The Soviet leadership feared that if they conducted operations that might extend into Pakistan they would draw the United States into a large-scale war that the Soviets did not want. So, conducting operations on the Afghan side of the border against the rebels was an activity that the Soviets could justify without drawing the United States into the war. According to Oliver Roy, the Soviet failure to seal the border with Pakistan was the most significant military mistake in the war against the Mujahideen (Roy, 1991). With an unsealed border, the United States with the help of the help of the Inter-Service Intelligence, ISI, began funneling in weapons to the Mujahideen in the 1980. At the start of 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency began to purchase weapons from several countries to include China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab nations. Once these weapons had been purchased they were shipped to the ISI headquarters located in Peshawar Pakistan. The United States funded some $30 million dollars in 1982, but in 1984, the CIA spent some $250 million purchasing pistols, AK-47s, ammunition, surface to air missiles, and other supplies for the Mujahideen. By 1985, the CIA was spending $500 million dollars on the resistance in Afghanistan. 1985 was the same year the President Ronald Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive 166. This directive stated that the CIA was to drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan †by all means available† (Crile, 2003, p 363). In 1986, the CIA approved the purchase of heat-seeking missiles and almost 1000 per purchased. The heat-seeking missiles were very effective in downing the Soviets helicopters, but the Mujahideen did not put these missions into use until 1987. Pakistan who was driven by Islamic identity had a vested interest in the outcome of the Soviet-Afghan War and made a great effort to ensure that the Mujahideen was victorious. To ensure victory for the Mujahideen, Pakistan established a network that would transport all of the weapons that had been purchased to the Mujahideen. Once all of the weapons that had been purchased and arrived to the ISI headquarters the ISI would distribute the weapons to the Mujahideen, who would get the weapons and supplies to the soldier in the field. The Mujahideen would use tractors, trucks, camel, mules, and horses that could blend in with the rest of the cross border traffic or they would move on dirt roads that were only accessible by foot over the border into Afghanistan. It is evident that without the help of the Pakistanis, the Mujahideen would not have been able to fight because they could have not been able to supply their soldiers. Throughout the war, the Soviets and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, DRA attempted to pressure Pakistan’s President Zia to seal the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan with troops, but this came to no avail. President Zia responds to the request to seal the border was that Pakistan would not do it but that the Red Army and the DRA were more than welcome to do it. Regardless of who would attempt to seal the border it would be an impossible task when you consider the length and mountainous terrain that would have to be covered. In 1985, the Red Army started to disrupt the Mujahideen supply lines by putting thousands of troops on the border with Pakistan. At the same time, The Red Army began a bombing campaign hitting border towns that were sympathetic to the rebels and placing Spetsnaz units along the borders to conduct search and destroy missions from behind Mujahideen front lines. The Red Army began using their gunships to move up and down the border looking for destroying Mujahideen supply caravans. The bombardment used by the Red Army turned a large portion of the border etween Afghanistan and Pakistan to land that no longer could be inhabited. This depopulation effort started to become effective as it made it almost impossible for the Mujahideen supply caravans to move freely. In 1986, the Mujahideen countered the Red Army by using the Stringer missiles to bring down the Red Army Helicopters. To avoid being hit by a Stringer missile the Red Army Pilots had to fly at a higher altitude but the higher alt itude made it difficult for the Red Army to effectively attack the Mujahideen supply lines. Although the terrain along the Afghan and Pakistan border made it difficult to totally seal the border, it would have been possible to disrupt the flow of men and supplies coming into Afghanistan. This was evident by the Red Army between 1985 and 1986. Had the Red Army been willing to take a higher loss of life before 1985, it would have been possible to slow down the Mujahideen’s ability to get weapons into Afghanistan. The inability by the Red Army to establish an effective way to disrupt the Mujahideen supply lines was not the only reason that the PDPA could not survive without the support of the Red Army. The Red Army also failed to build an Afghan National Army that could protect the PDPA against the Mujahideen. Part of the reason why the Red Army could not stand up the Afghan Army was because there were Mujahideen sympathizers in the ranks. This is also part of the reason why the Soviets could not win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, they left the country without the means to protect its self. Failure to build an Afghan Army As early as 1980, Soviet leadership knew that it was going to be difficult to build up the Afghan Army. This was partially due to the fact that the PDPA regime was unpopular with many Afghan people, and there was also a deep hatred for the Red Army troops. The unwillingness to fight for the Soviet Union and the DRA was reflected by the decrease in the Afghan Army’s ranks. The Afghan Army decreased from 90,000 to 30,000 men from 1980 to 1983 (Schofield, 2003). During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it was common for Afghan soldiers to leave their units with their weapons and ammunition and join the Mujahideen. There is an account in July 1987 where an entire 2,000-man unit defected to the Mujahideen in Kandahar (McMichael, 1991). In addition to the defecting that was happening there were reports of Afghan officers frequently sabotaging Soviet equipment and vehicles. For the Afghans who remained many only fought because of the Soviet troops presences on the frontlines who would not allow them to runaway. As a result of the Afghans people unwillingness to fight for the Soviets and the DRA, the PDPA could only build a small military force, the total that numbers 120,000 to 150,000 fighting men. With its small size and the challenges they had recruiting the Afghans to fight for the PDPA regime, the Afghan Army was ineffective. The Afghan government was also only able to draft sixty-five percent of the personnel it needed to fight the insurgency they faced. Although the Afghan Army did have their share of success, these successes were limited. Mostly because the Mujahideen had sympathizers in the ranks that would provide the rebels with intelligence about upcoming operations that were planned. Since Mujahideen supporters had infiltrated the Afghan Army, Red Army soldier do not care to work closely on operations or share the intelligence they had because of fear that the details on upcoming operations would be shared with the rebels. To make matter worse for both sides, commanding officers of Afghan units would only be informed of upcoming operations one day in advance. On 9 January 1981, a conscription law designed to increase the strength of the DRA Army, was adopted by the Supreme Military Council of Afghanistan. The Afghan Army was given tanks, aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and small arms by the Soviets. Regardless of what had been given to the Afghan Army they were not going to be able to defend the PDPA regime from the rebels by the time the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. This is based on the fact that it was going to be hard to recruit soldiers to fight for a socialist an also because many of the soldiers that had been recruited were informant for the Mujahideen. â€Å"The ineffectiveness of the DRA Army was illustrated by two Soviet deserters when they said, â€Å"The Kabul army was not an army, just a mess, with half of the soldiers running away and the other half joining the rebels† (Amstutz, 1986, p. 80). The inability of the Soviets to win over the Afghan population showed to be a tremendous obstacle as the attempt was being made to stand up an effective Afghan military. Had the Soviets convince the Afghan population that the PDPA was worth fighting for; the Soviet’s counterinsurgency plan could have been more effective in getting rid of the Mujahideen. The Soviets inability to win over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people ended up being a big obstacle that led to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. Failure to win the Hearts and Minds â€Å"The Soviets needed to convince the Afghan population that it had a stake in the survival of the socialist regime if they were to have a chance of preserving the PDPA government† (Delgado, 2006, p. 27). This would show to be impossible since the Afghan mullahs had declared jihad against the occupying Red Army. Knowing the jihad had been declared against the Red Army, they still launched a program with the intent on winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The Soviets attempt to Sovietize the Afghan people used measures that included revamping the education system and teaching the population a pro-Soviet ideology. Adults and children were taught Marxist terms by Soviet institutions that had been imported into Afghanistan. The Soviets reformed the education system, reinterpreting Afghan history, taking control of the media in order to reeducate adults, and sending children to the Soviet Union in order to be educated. The Soviets goal in all of this was to create a version of Islam that the new Afghanistan would be based off. Building a strong Communist party was part of the Sovietization program. A strong Communist party would be the center of all legitimate political activity for the country. In order to monitor social organizations in Afghanistan, Soviet style government institution were established. A diligent effort had been made by the PDPA to indoctrinate its member, a majority of which joined the party so that they could obtain a job in the state. The task of trying to indoctrinate the member was difficult and many felt that it was irresponsible and corrupt. The DRA was unpopular throughout a large portion of Afghanistan. With this unpopular view of the DRA, there was a need to rewrite history in order to paint the Soviet Union in a more favorable light. This change to history was going to be done in two parts, first was to depict Russia as the essential supporters of Afghan independence, and the second was to minimize the cultural ties the Afghan people had with India, Pakistan, and Iran while emphasizing the ties with the citizens of the Soviet Union. The Soviets strategy in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people was not to turn all Afghan into Marxist, but to teach the Afghans that they identified more with the Soviet way of life than with traditional Afghan society and customs (Roy, 1989). The Soviets took total control of the Afghan media and bombarded it with pro-Soviet propaganda. The Soviets desired in all of this was to have the Afghans forget what their history was and replace it with the identity that the Soviets were giving them. The Soviets not only rewrote the history books and took over the media; the Soviets took control of the education system with the goal of molding a new generation of Afghans that would support the PDPA. To accomplish this, teachers who refused to do what was asked were arrested or exiled. â€Å"Fatherland Training Centers† were created around Afghanistan, where Afghan orphans were trained to be Soviet special agents, political organizations for children and teenagers in order to teach them to become faithful Soviet citizens. The Soviets made Russian the official language of all students attending middle school up to college. The Russians were committed to indoctrinating Afghan children. Statics reflects that by 1989, 000 Afghan students were being educated in the Soviets, and another 15,000 students annual would travel to the Soviet Union see the Russian way of life and to take part in short courses and training programs (Roy, 1989). The Soviets used psychological operation to undermine not only the Mujahideen but also the civilian population to resist the Soviet occupation and the PDPA regime. Some of the bigger programs used included massive leaflet drops, propagandistic radio programs, starting conflict between rival tribes that would undermine Mujahideen unity and bribing teachers to use their classroom in order to spread Soviet propaganda. KHAD Intelligence would insert special agents into Mujahideen units and prisons where Mujahideen members were held with the goal of getting information on operations that were being planned and to find out whom the leaders in the resistance were. Regardless of what the Soviets attempted to do in order to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people they failed. The Afghans remained true to their Islamic identity, culture, and family traditions so it made it impossible for the Soviet Union to convince the Afghans that they were acting in the best interest of the country of Afghanistan by occupying and supporting the PDPA. With a call of jihad being declared against the occupying Red Army, it was going to be impossible for the Soviets to win the hearts and minds. The Afghans viewed the Soviets as an occupying force that were hostile to Islam so no program introduced by the Soviets to win the hearts and minds would be successful. The Soviets made an admirable effort to win over the Afghan people but due to the fact that they were viewed as a foreign occupier took away any possibility that they could convince the Afghan people to support the PDPA government. Winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people were impossible from the beginning since the Afghan people had such a strong Islamic heritage and tribal culture and that the Soviets were viewed as a foreign occupier, but the Soviets also did not help themselves with their brutal campaign to drive Mujahideen supporters out of Afghanistan as refugees. The effort to rid Afghanistan of Mujahideen supporters left one million Afghan civilians dead and five million displaced (Roy, 1989). The strategy used by the Red Army to rid Afghanistan of Mujahideen supported included artillery strike against Pashtun villages, bombing raids and, the burning of agricultural fields, the killing of livestock through the use mines and artillery, and the contamination of water and food supplies through the use of chemical weapons (McMichael, 1991). The efforts made by the Red Army to deprive the Mujahideen from a portion of its civilian support network was successful, but with the brutal methods that the Soviets used in order to get the objectives done did very little for the chances of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Conclusion The Soviets lost the Soviet-Afghan War to the Mujahideen do to their own failures and any country could stand to earn a few lessons from the Soviets after their experience in Afghanistan. The first lesson would be the importance of disrupting the Mujahideen supply lines. Although totally securing the border may have been impossible, the Red Army could have focus more of an effort prior to 1985 to slow down the amount of men and supplies that were moving into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Had the Soviets been willing to take more of rest with their Soldiers, the Mujahideen would have never been able to get the supplies they needed into Afghanistan. The second lesson that could be taken from this is that before the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan they needed to ensure that the Afghan Army was ready to defeat the Mujahideen on their own. Since the Afghan Army was not able to defeat the Mujahideen on their own, everything that the Soviets attempted to achieve in Afghanistan was lost once the Red Army withdrew. The weak Army allowed Afghanistan to fall into a civil war where the Taliban came out victorious. The Soviets should have taken into consideration what they thought the status Afghan Army would be once they withdrew before invading Afghanistan. The third and final lesson is that it was going to be impossible for the Soviets to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Many Afghans viewed the Soviets as invaders, and a jihad had been declared against them. Along with the hatred that the Afghans had for the Soviets the Soviets also countered themselves with brutal military operations against Afghans that were thought to be loyal to the Mujahideen. The Afghan population will refuse to support a regime that is viewed as a foreign occupier, regardless of the sophistication of the occupying country’s effort to win the native hearts and minds†(Delgado, 2006, p. 35). References Crile, G. (2003). Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History. New York, NY: Delgado, J. A. (2006). Troubling Parallels: An analysis of America ’s Inability to overcome the obstacles that led to the defeat of the Red Army in the Soviet-Afghan War. Athens, OH: The University of Ohio. Hills, C. R. (2006). Beyond Charlie Wilson: The Soviet Afghan War. Atlanta, GA: Atlanta International School. McMichael, S. (1991). Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London, England: Brasseys. Roy, O. (1989). The Sovietization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Roy, O. (1991). The Lessons of the Soviet-Afghan War. London, England: Brasseys. Schofield, V. (2003). Afghan Frontier. New York, NY: Tauris Parke Paperback.

Mangy Parrot Essay -- Analysis, Fernández de Lizardi

Parrots are beautiful intelligent birds. Mange is a festering disease caused by parasitic mites that dig into the body and results in unsightly sores and unremitting irritation. Who or what does The Mangy Parrot refer to? Is Mangy Parrot simply Periquillo’s nickname or is it intended to be a metaphor for New Spain? If the parrot is symbolic of the lands and people of New Spain: the colonial caste system and government is the disease infesting the land. Unable to publish his views directly due to censorship, de Lizardi wrote his apparently humorous, entertaining tale as a cover for his ideas. Throughout the story Fernà ¡ndez de Lizardi cleverly interweaves his true objective which is to increase opposition to the colonial societal and governmental practices and encourage support for the coming revolution. Lizardi begins his tale with the story of binding babies’ hands. The old women bind infants’ hands simply because it had been done to them and therefore this made it the best policy and the old ways should be followed even when there is no evidence to support them. (de Lizardi, p. 2) When Lizardi began his serialized novel the Spanish had been exercising colonial control for three hundred years. During that time the Enlightenment and both the American and French Revolutions had taken place. The rights of man philosophies that fostered those revolutions made many of the aspects of Spanish colonial rule outdated and corrupt. The author is informing the reader from the outset that he is done with the old ways and that they no longer deserve to be supported. As the novel progresses, de Lizardi’s use of satire grow until his characters make such outlandish or unqualified statements that they cannot be taken for anything othe... ...bers and Indians to achieve parity in the system is to overthrow the system and demand equal treatment and opportunities. The use of humor and satire is only effective when the reader identifies with the kernel of truth at the core of the joke. The entertaining story of Periquillo’s misadventures was not just a funny story but also contained a bitter commentary on the state of colonial rule. Serialized publication in the native language allowed for the story to reach the masses and kept the issues in the public eye by spoon feeding weekly accounts that built up public awareness and increased discontent with the status quo. De Lizardi’s unapologetic fictionalized first person account of life in New Spain exposed the corruption, injustice, prejudice and inequities in society caused by the colonial caste system and encouraged public support for a revolution.

Reaearch Article Analysis Essay

The system of law enforcement course of action making is a perpendicular form and a parallel political dynamic. The system of law enforcement research had the knowledge and ability to apply the decision – making process within state law enforcement courses and administrative divisions can control resolutions by giving studies to meet policy maker’s needs. This document gives a schematic outlook on the system of law enforcement determination – making methods and speaks of how researchers can make his or her accomplishments pertinent within it. Purpose The system of law enforcement action adopted and pursued by government examinations aimed at the discovery and interpretation of new knowledge seeks to equip assessments and examinations of a serious offense and provides tactics for its reduction. The number in the system of law enforcement and the scientific study of crimes periodical, analysis, and a printed narrative are full of new knowledge and policy examinations. In fact, one topic has obtained reduced recognition; however, it is how the system of law enforcement action planned and administrative divisions use the system of law enforcement in programs developing and policy making. To obtain federal money each state upholds law enforcement actions by the government and plans establishments (Garrison, 2009). Government and regional police departments establish the system of judicial body, corrections, and non – profit associations obtain money through these law enforcement establishments to assist law enforcement responsi bilities. Law enforcement researchers can make his or her business more applicable to law enforcement policy makers by having knowledge of the art of science of government authority, and policy dynamics that govern how establishments function. Law enforcement principles and intentions are ethically – based entities. By this Dena means that the law enforcement principles work in an enclosed area that negotiates with confident questions of correct and incorrect what establishes fairness and prejudice as well as the attention of an individual’s obligation. In fact, the appearance of these morals explains the division of law enforcement and law enforcement policy – making establishments from other establishments for example, original or medical sciences. Dissimilar to the institutions and Dena’s conversation, law enforcement, the natural sciences does not associate the causes of human weakness (Garrison, 2009). Problem The reason for dysfunction, our, unlike hypothesis propose are inward and outward causes for example, a need of political authority and poor disorders (Garrison, 2009). Considering how these reasons are observed and defined these causes have moral meanings associated with them. Important, the law enforcement design is a subject that regular people can readily associate to and reveal views (at least in appreciation to causation) without immersion and guidance in control (Garrison, 2009). The law enforcement design transmissions on the primary surface of policy making, exercising or seeking power in the governmental or public affairs, the study of the nature and origin of ideals. Questions and answers Is the behavior of wrongdoings in a village a law enforcement matter or a public health matter? Answer – it is a law enforcement matter because law enforcement and others for example, judges, and lawyers have to decide the punishment for the criminal but the punishment for the criminal depends on what the wrong doing was. Is the answer to a wrongdoing a discipline and containment design or a medical design in which methods are the key product? Answer – in this case it would be a medical model because treatment would be the factor to the individual or individuals involved in the wrong doing. Is wrongdoing a matter of a person’s chosen conduct or is the outcome of environmental methods past the constrain or obligation of the individual? Answer – this can be both because the person chooses to conduct the wrong doing but the environmental factors for example; the individual coming from a poor neighborhood could also contribute to the individual’s action (Garrison, 2009 & White, 2013). Describe the design of the study Examinations can affect the exercising or seeking power in governmental affairs, the study of the nature, and the origin of ideals concern that in turn, holds design within the law enforcement outlined establishments. To accomplish control in the resolution events the researchers must uphold both traditional esteem, and a character of presented unprejudiced examinations by policy makers (Weiss, 1976, Ross & Shapiro, 1999).The theoretical probability and the absence of a political bias of the researcher are the central results to acceptability. If individuals see an analysis as too reserved or too permissive, his or her research results are not considered worthy if the decision makers do not bestow the equal political theory (Garrison, 2009). It is better for an analysis to have no political character, thus leaving his or her qualification the main representative to create opinions. The design represents how an analysis can motivate one or more important individuals of the counsel by supplying the individuals with studies that reverberates carefully with the moral and political theories to those constituents. In fact, those constituents make the whole counsel. In addition, the politics, and authority of the council will resolve if a policy conclusion will transpire and what policies, if made, researchers will transcribe to the supervisor to carry out (Garrison, 2009). The planning administrative division manages the s econd level of the planning, carries out the decisions of the goals and puts the policy into the curriculum. In fact, once the counsel informs the supervisor on the policy it is his or her responsibility to seek the details of practice commonly regarding a workers topic, and this is at the decision of the supervisor. Thus, the judgment making authority for carrying out changes are to an individual opinion maker. In addition, analysists must know what position of decision – making policy or a specific responsibility or curriculum is under to decide how the analysis can be substantial. Furthermore, if an establishment needs details, evaluations, or data on policy process is in its planning notable action studies that provides transparent and operational data will have a big effect on the method (Weiss, 1976). Operational Definition From an un widely administrative system (Hall, 1989) exercising or seeking power in governmental or public affairs concern in a course of action adopted by the government there is another view to the art or science of government on decision making –political timing. The British Navy incorporated lemons in the diet of the crew members to fight a disease 263 years back after medical science demonstrated the usefulness. Although the connection separating smoking and lung cancer was made in 1950 it was not until the 1990s that a government policy was put into place to stop smoking in individuals 18 and younger (Lomas, 2000). Inductive Logic To furnish assorted control establishments and stakeholders with an examination aimed at the discovery and interoperation of new knowledge there are three processes. One – a portion of the study is left out and rejects the outcome because researchers defy the outcome. Exercising or seeking power in governmental or public affairs. Two – studies center on clauses and delicate variations in information, but center on clauses and limitations not well accepted in the public policy (Ross & Shapiro, 1999). Three – using the identical data conservatives makes noted facts and policy makers make a course of action adopted by the government. Ross & Shapiro advises that a course of action adopted by government that studies can have exercising or seeking power in the government, and define the studies or if the examinations have worth (Ross & Shapiro, 1999). Deductive Logic The success of making examinations aimed at the discovery greater, and beneficial analysis comprehend processes. There can be no individual correct opinion in government judgment making, values, and examination outcomes will never be understand or believed enough to give the conclusion in a policy dispute (Weiss, 1982). In fact, researchers who do not have the quality or power for making the last policy decision do not obtain a course of action adopted by the government. In addition, actions adopted by the government when in question about what data researchers require, researchers obtain information that is pleasant or relating to government in the researchers association (Weiss, 1982). Furthermore, actions adopted, and pursued by government makers are feeling at ease with the condition and do not alter easily. Finally, the governmental affairs use researchers to back a predetermined policy position is a worthy use of analysis because it gives individuals the general understanding f or the analysis (Weiss, 1982). Findings The significant basis that courses bring to the course of action process is a self – governing, logical method. The stakes are high and some topics are likely argued by special interest stakeholders. The data has to support credibility (Ross & Shapiro, 1999). In fact, researchers should stay away from political discussion on what the researcher means for future policy making. Researchers examining analysis and outcomes based on authorities’ information, individuals should keep in mind that authorities control information is complete information. Furthermore, information can be explained lawfully in unusual ways, and the choice of possible explanations of information can come about from government actions, and have the same legitimacy (Ross & Shapiro, 1999). Qualitative or Quantitative The information in this document is qualitative data because there is information and opinions on many levels. Information is part of a method that contains giving training and understanding for policy deliberations producing words for accepting dilemmas, and producing answers that happen over time (Rist, 1994). With this qualitative data consisting of values represent qualities of non-numerical categories (Bennett, Briggs, & Triola, 2009). This is important because it gives information estimation, awareness of past information and analysis on what causes have been and what have not been put into place pertaining to the development (Rist, 1994). In conclusion, research is important in law enforcement policies because the information received can determine what policies have and have not been put into place, and if new policies need to be added. Researchers have to pay attention to the information collected, and have the information needed to know what can and what cannot be used. In fact, researchers give the government the last choice on rather they should use the information or not. Decisions are very important in the research area of law enforcement because the research changes therefore; researchers must have the knowledge and skills on when and when not to use specific data. References Bennett, J.O., Briggs, W.L., & Triola, M.F. (2009). Statistical reasoning for everyday life (3rd ed.) .Boston, MA: Pearson/Addison Wesley Dictionary.com (2013) Garrison, A.H. (2009). The Influence of Research on Criminal Justice Policy Making. Professional Issues in Criminal Justice, 4(1), Lomas, J. (2000, Spring). Connecting research and policy. ISUMA, (), 140-144. Rist, R. (1994). Influencing the policy process with qualitative research. Handbook on qualitative research, (), . Weiss, J. (1976). Using Social Science for Social Policy. Policy Studies Journal, 4(3), 234-238. Weiss, J. (1982). Policy research in the context of diffuse decision making. The Journal of Higher Education, 53(6), 619-639.

Life Pi By Yann Martel And The Movie Life Of Pi Directed...

Many famous novels have been rearranged in order to make movies. However, the quality of the movie, a lot of the times, depends on the changes made when adapting the novel to film. The director of the movie needs to make sure that the film does not cut off significant parts, and at the same time, abstain from the unnecessary parts the writer made without changing the whole theme. Moreover, they need to add in more characters and scenes to make the film more creative and understandable. In this essay, the comparison of differences in the novel Life of Pi by Yann Martel and the movie Life of Pi directed by Lee Ann will be discussed. The setting has not changed when it is transferred to the movie. The settings are: Pondicherry, India; the†¦show more content†¦So Pi’s mother forces Pi to work for a dance class to calm down, but one of the dancers soon adapt a deep relationship with Pi. This situation actually makes Pi’s move to Canada more difficult. Thus, it led to another conjecture of Pi was trying to hide his girlfriend onto the lifeboat and bring her also to Canada, because in the movie, Pi mentioned, â€Å"†¦ but I don’t remember saying goodbye.† What books cannot achieve is the sceneries and effects that film can include. Compare to the book, Lee created more stunning scenes using special effects. When the readers reach to the point of Pi describing the ocean, they can try their best to imagine the whole landscape and situation, but the feeling of helplessly floating on the ocean cannot be illustrated using only personal experiences. The ocean in the movie can remind the audiences about how small people are compared to the world—the irresistible sense of unknown and tininess, would provoke people to think about their origins. The sunken scene of the ship â€Å"Tsimtsum† is tiny compared to â€Å"Titanic†, but at the moment of the ship sank, when Pi is floating on the dark ocean in the night, the drowning feeling that audiences can experience certainly is not worse than â€Å"Titanic†. Lee used lots of scenes and background music to bring immersive feeling to the audiences. When it reached to the storm scene, the camera